In military parlance, “Dien Bien Phu” has also become a synonym for an extremely unwise decision: the attempt to hold a seemingly strong defensive position, against which the enemy, cooperating with the defender’s plans, will then destroy himself against the impregnable fortifications.

 

𝐁𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐠𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐝

The French had two objectives in seizing Dien Bien Phu: protecting access to Laos and luring the North Vietnamese Army to attack the fortified Dien Bien Phu defenses. The first objective required mobile forces to operate from the base. For this reason, the French high command selected Brigadier General Christian de Castries, a specialist in armored operations, as the operational commander. It was expected he could use the tanks flown into Dien Bien Phu. The opportunity never developed, as the tanks quickly failed. The second objective would have repeated French success at the Battle of Na San, which may have encouraged the French to believe the enemy would again smash themselves against a fixed position taken by airborne troops.

 

While these objectives seemed reasonable, serious analysis should have shown the French commanders that Dien Bien Phu was far more isolated and far more dependent on air mobility than Na San. Additionally, the Viet Minh commander Vo Nguyen Giap did not play the part the French commander, Henri Navarre, had written for him.

 

The Dien Bien Phu operations were a part of a broader French Indochinese colonial policy aimed at containing the spread of North Vietnamese communism and the ideas of national liberation. Dien Bien Phu was on the main road between North Vietnam and Laos; control of this town was vital to controlling the lines of supply and communication between North Vietnam and Laos, not just Tonkin and the Red River Delta. The latter had been the focus of previous operations in the region, and it was a new French priority to block movement into Laos.

 

The French commission of inquiry, however, believed that the highest political authority had set Navarre’s highest priority as protecting the French Expeditionary Force.

Even with the much greater historical material available today, there are still inconsistencies in timelines and other information about the battle. The French command structure, which was to some degree split, is confusing both in its very makeup, the authorities at any given point, and the taking of actions while apparently simultaneously in possession of intelligence suggesting an action would be unwise. Unity of command, or having a single final decision-maker, is a repeated problem during the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, unity of command problems were evident at the 1963 Battle of Ap Bac, with disagreements internal to South Vietnamese commanders, internal to US advisory command, and Vietnamese-American relationships. There were unity of command problems in the 1972 Operation LINEBACKER II all-American bombing of the North.

 

The timing of the first Communist response, especially deliberate ones rather than immediate response to the landings of the paratroopers, is not clear. In particular, various accounts of the dynamics among Giap’s headquarters, the Lao Dong Party (i.e., Indonesian/Vietnamese Communist leadership), and the Chinese Military Assistance Group (CMAG) as well as Chinese Politburo have inconsistencies. Some reports have the Chinese advisers demanding an immediate attack on the paratroopers still forming, some suggest it never happened, and others say Giap started but then stopped it to move to a more deliberate approach. There are also reports that some Chinese decisions reflected, very quickly, the results of secret US-French meetings in Washington, with a distinct lack of clarity about how the Chinese learned about things held tightly in Western governments.

 

Even though there are joint Vietnamese-Western historical meetings, some of the truth may never be known, since most of the key officials have died. Genaral Giap, while retired, is one of the few living principals, who wrote about it at the time, but has recently discussed it, much more frankly, with American retired officers.

 

𝐅𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐚 𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐃𝐢𝐞𝐧 𝐁𝐢𝐞𝐧 𝐏𝐡𝐮 𝐜𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐢𝐠𝐧:

These are the historical sites of the 56-day and night fierce battle of Vietnamese troops and people, which results in our glorious victory of Dien Bien Phu.